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Abstract
Model checking is shown to be an effective tool in validating the behavior of a fault tolerant embedded
spacecraft controller. The case study presented here shows that by judiciously abstracting away extraneous
complexity, the state space of the model could be exhaustively searched allowing critical functional
requirements to be validated down to the design level. Abstracting away detail not germane to the problem
of interest leaves by definition a partial specification behind. The success of this procedure shows that it is
feasible to effectively validate a partial specification with this technique. Three anomalies were found in
the system one of which is an error in the detailed requirements, and the other two are missing/ambiguous
requirements. Because the method allows validation of partial specifications, it also is an effective
methodology towards maintaining fidelity between a co-evolving specification and an implementation.
Keywords: linear temporal logic, communications protocol, checkpointing and rollback, mark and
rollback, synchronous communication, requirements validation, fault tolerance
1 Introduction
This paper describes a practical application of model checking for validating the requirements for a
complex embedded system. The case study described here is of a dually redundant spacecraft controller, in
which a checkpoint and rollback scheme is used to provide fault tolerance during the execution of critical
control sequences. The software requirements specification for the spacecraft specifies the required
behavior for the checkpoint and rollback scheme. However, the validity of these requirements could not be
determined through inspection. In other words, it was not possible to determine whether the behavior
described in these requirements would provide the desired level of fault tolerance. More importantly,
testing of the eventual implementation would not necessarily provide this validation either, due to the
difficulty of ensuring test case coverage for all possible fault occurrence scenarios.
The approach described here uses a formal automata-based model derived from the specification. We used
various high-level safety properties to validate the generalized system model. Key system functional
requirements were then validated by defining corresponding liveness properties in linear temporal logic,
which were required to be satisfied when the system responds to errors. We used the model checker Spin to
identify traces in the model for which these properties were violated.
The work described in this paper forms part of an on-going investigation into lightweight formal methods
for V&V of requirements specifications. We use the term 'lightweight' to indicate that the methods can be
used to perform partial analysis on partial specifications, without a commitment to developing and
baselining complete, consistent formal specifications. The formal methods are used to model critical
chunks of an informal specification, to check that key properties hold. The aim is to find errors, rather than
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to prove correctness. Application of the methods is driven by the needs of the project, and is used as a
modeling tool to answer questions that arise during verification and validation.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a motivation for the case study by briefly surveying
existing approaches to requirements validation and demonstrating why these approaches do not provide the
desired level of assurance. We introduce the distinction between verifying requirements through
completeness and consistency checking, and validating requirements against real world properties ('claims)
that should follow if the statement of the requirements is correct.
Section 3 introduces the dually redundant system, and shows how it was expressed as a FSM. We show
how the system behaves as a communications system, making it particularly amenable to analysis using the
model checker Spin.
Section 4 describes the steps that were taken to optimize the model, in order to reduce the size of the state
space. We show how the model was partitioned into five separate fault scenarios, and explain in detail how
one of these scenarios was checked. We discuss the process of checking the model against claims expressed
as linear temporal logic formulae. Section 5 presents the results of the analysis.
Section 6 provides a discussion of the results, including a reflection on the benefits seen in the case study.
The importance of partitioning the model in order to make the analysis feasible is discussed, along with
some reflection on the resulting limitation of the analysis ('partial analysis of partial specifications).
Section 7 presents conclusions and describes our future work. A short overview of the theoretical basis for
the use of the LTL and Biichi automata is provided in appendix A.
2 Background
Requirements validation is the process of determining that the specified requirements capture the real world
needs of the stakeholders. For real-time control systems, this involves checking that the specified behavior
will in fact provide safe and effective control, without introducing any undesirable effects. For reasonably
complex systems, validity of the requirements is hard to establish. Informal methods only provide a very
basic level of assurance, by imposing a structure on the specification that facilitates inspection by domain
experts. Formal methods have the potential to provide a much greater level of assurance, through the
construction of a precise model of the requirements, which can be tested against domain properties.
A number of formal modeling tools are available that are applicable to software systems. Heitmeyer and
Mandrioli [1] provide an excellent overview of the current state of the art. Here we concentrate on state
machine models, which can be used to test safety and liveness properties.
RSML [2] and SCR [3] have both been very successful at providing static analysis techniques for checking
completeness and consistency of specifications expressed as deterministic state machines. However, fault
tolerant systems are inherently non-deterministic, that is, the transition schemes are relational not
functional. Systems with inherent non-determinism are not easily amenable to analytic static evaluation
methods. Systems that can be partitioned into a deterministic and a non-deterministic part can apply tools
such as RSML or SCR to validate deterministic components. For example, Easterbrook [4] has reported
using the SCR tool in this way to validate the Fault Detection, Isolation and Recovery (FDIR) requirements
for a spacecraft bus controller. The deterministic part was modeled in SCR, and then extended to include
non-deterministic elements (i.e. fault occurrences) using the Spin model checker [5]. Such a procedure
would be suggested for example when an otherwise deterministic system had to be shown to be resilient
under (non-deterministic) fault injection.
An analysis based methodology such as RSML or SCR requires determinism in the underlying model to
prove requirements completeness and consistency. In contrast, state space exploration methods ('model
checking') are operational in nature rather than analytic. They allow functional requirements to be validated
over non-deterministic finite state machines using optimized reachability schemes. By incorporating
functional requirements in a non-deterministic model, requirements properties can be validated. Manna and
Pneuli [6] have shown that virtually any expressible requirements property can be represented as a safety,
precedence, or iiveness property using the Linear Temporal Logic (see appendix A).
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Tool Deterministic Non- Counter Requirements Developed for
Deterministic Example Expressible as V&V of
Generation LTL Formulae
RSML Y TCAS
SCR Y Y A7e Aircraft
S/W
Murphi Y Y Y Single Process
S/W
SMV Y Y Y Comms H/W
Spin Y Y Y Comms S/W
Table1:SystemValidationTools
Three such model checkers have been widely used for verification of low-level designs of both hardware
and software, and communication protocols. The Murphi model checker has a rich support for temporal
logic and allows invariants to be expressed in the model to be checked as the state space exploration
evolves. It supports a single site model only, which is a disadvantage in the validation of concurrent
systems. The Symbolic Model Verifier (SMV) has been applied successfully to communication protocols
[7]. SMV can validate synchronous and asynchronous systems against a system specification specified in
the temporal logic CTL [8]. It allows for non-determinism in the specifications and for concurrency in the
model within procedures. It supports rich temporal logic specifications but does not support complex data
structures, making it difficult to build a complete low level model. Both SMV and Murphi were designed
for validating hardware systems. The Spin model checker was designed for verification of communication
protocols, and provides support for a basic set of software data structures.
Each of the three model checkers permit a rich set of temporal logic formulae to be incorporated into the
modeling system. We chose to use the Spin model checking system for this study because it (a) was
designed to validate software communications protocols (a) is algorithmic in nature (c) supports data
structures allowing detail where appropriate (d) incorporates linear temporal logic primitives allowing
functional requirements to be validated over the model (e) and, significantly, because the modeling system
can be used to validate functional requirements over traces from the implementation.
3 DRS High Level Model Description
The case study described here is a Dually Redundant System (DRS) for a spacecraft controller, consisting
of two hardware platforms running identical software to maximize system reliability and availability. The
systems exchange information to synchronize software operation. One of the systems has control of the
system bus and is called the prime string. The other, known as the online string, provides a backup,
executing in synchronization or at most within one second of the prime string. Information is exchanged
between the two systems by the synchronous (rendezvous) communication of a 32-word table, the State
Table Broadcast (STB), broadcast by the prime string once per second. The online string uses this to keep
itself in synchronization with the prime string.
The system executes high priority programs called critical sequences that must be tolerant of arbitrary
faults. To this end, the strings use a variant of the checkpoint and rollback process found to work well in
industrial applications [9]. Checkpoints correspond to completed transactions in the executable code. Such
a completion is referred to as a commit operation, meaning that if a system crash occurs, system operations
could be rolled back to the point where the commit occurred and proceed from here. The spacecraft
controller works analogously except that the checkpoints are referred to as markpoints, and are hard coded
into the executing program.
For example, consider the retrieval and return of a soil sample by a remote robot. Successful retrieval of the
sample is an operation that need not be repeated. The code ending in the completion of this process would
be delineated with a markpoint. The next group of instructions might be the storage of the sample that was
just retrieved, at the end of which would be another markpoint. If any operation were interrupted by the
occurrence of a fault, the system would repair the fault; roll back control to the beginning of the last
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markpoint;andcontinuexecutionfromthere.It wouldnotbenecessarytowastebatterypowerortimeto
retrieveanothersampleif thatwasalreadyachieved.Thispaperfocusesonthevalidationofthefault
toleranceprovidedbythismarkandrollbackprocess.
Thefaultcontainmentrequirementsspecifythatfaultprotectionshalloperateonlyintheprimestring.
Whiletheprimestringisrepairingafault,theonlinestringmuststopexecutingitscopyofthecritical
sequenceandwaitfortheSTBtotellit thatthefaulthasbeenrepaired,therebysignalingit toproceedwith
thecriticalsequence.
Therollbackrequirementsspecifythathreefull secondsofexecutiontimeshallbeallowedtopassaftera
newmarkpointisencounteredbythesoftwarebeforethenewmarkpointisrecognizedasalegitimate
rollbackpoint.Thisisbecausethesystemcontrolsexternale ementsthataremostlymechanicalinnature.
Accordingly,thesoftwareis,ingeneral,alwaysaheadofthehardware.Thethree-seconddelaygivesany
mechanicalt sksachancetobecompleted,andforanyfaultsthatoccurredtobeproperlylogged,before
theprevioussectionofthecriticalsequenceanbeconsideredsuccessfullycomplete.Toimplementthis
requirement,eachnewmarkpointisagedeachsecondbyonesecondbymovingit oneleveldeeperina
three-levelbuffer.Onlymarkpointsthathavereachedthebottomwillbeeligibleforuseintherollback
process.Figure1showsahighlevelsnapshotfnormalcriticalsequenceoperationi bothstrings.
4 Validation Procedure
4.1 Modeling
The first step was to produce a state model of the DRS system. To model the specified behavior, we treated
the mark and rollback process as a communications system. Holzmann [10] has defined a communications
protocol as a five component specification for how communication is to be carded out in an error free way
among two or more separate elements. For the mark and rollback process, these properties are:
1. The service provided by the protocol is to keep the prime and the online systems in synchronization.
This is done so that the online string can take over quickly should the prime system become
inoperable.
2. The environmental assumptions are that the prime string interacts with an entity that provides
information about faults.
3. The major vocabulary consists of the variables SFP, CS, and CM. SFP is the Spacecraft Fault
Protection flag. When this flag is set, the system has experienced a fault that has not yet been repaired.
The CS flag is set in the prime string and in the backup string when the critical sequence is active i.e.
running in each respective string. The CM flag is set to indicate that the critical sequence is active or in
standby pending the repair of a fault and accordingly to remind the strings that when an interfering
fault is fixed, the suspended critical sequence needs to be restarted at the last valid aged markpoint.
4. The three protocol flags each use single bit encoding, as shown in Table 2.
5. The procedure rules are most complex to deal with, the hardest to specify, the most difficult to
validate. Most of the validation work occurs here. Examples from the mark and rollback support
application are that the protocol variables SFP, CM, and CS are to be broadcast once each second to
the online string and actually also back to the prime string by the prime string to allow the prime string
Flag Value Meaning
SFP 1 fault
0 cleared
CS 1 CS executing
0 CS not executing
CM 1 CS active or suspended
0 CS inactive and not suspended
Table2:CommunicationFlags
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Figure1: A partialstatechartfor theDRSprimestring
to check its own synchronization.
The initial model was represented using statecharts [11]. Figures 1 and 2 show portions of the statecharts
for the prime and online strings respectively.
In the case study presented here certain types of faults are of such a nature that they can be repaired by the
prime string. When a fault occurs, the three protocol flags (CS, CM, SFP) change state from (1, 1, 0) to (0,
1, 1). This information is broadcast to the online string once per second. When the online string sees the
SFP flag is set, it suspends operation of the executing critical sequence and waits for the prime string to
repair the fault. Once the fault is repaired, the prime string can roll back to the last valid markpoint and
resume processing. The online string will see the new SFP flag is reset in the STB message, rollback to the
aged broadcast markpoint and restart its copy of the critical sequence.
This example shows a small subset of the actual elements and their procedure rules that belong in each
category. The complete protocol specification is in excess of 80 pages.
4.2 Estimation of State Space Size
Once an initial model is obtained, the state space size must be estimated, in order to assess the potential for
automated validation. This was done by estimating the number of substates needed in the Spin model to
implement each state shown on the statecharts. For example, the full statechart for the prime string has 16
states and each could be implemented with say 4 substates giving 4 x 4 x ... x 4 = 416 states total.
The rendezvous communication contains 32 data elements 5 of which are unused leaving a total of 27
elements. Each of these remaining 27 is at least a binary flag. This gives 2 x 2 x 2 ... x 2 = 227 states as a
minimum. This contributes to the overall state space in each of the strings. For the prime string we get 416
x 227 = 259 states.
The full statechart for the online string has 14 states. Assuming 4 substates for each gives 4 x 4 x ... x 4 =
414 states. The rendezvous communication packet again contributes 227 states giving 414 × 227 = 241 states
total. Both strings operating as one system will have accordingly
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Figure2: A partialstatechartfor theDRSonlinestring
(259 states prime string) x (241 states online string) = 2100 states.
With a CPU that executes I state per microsecond, the system will traverse its reachability graph in about
1016 years.
The problem of interest here is to discover the failure modes of this system. To be able to do this we must
reduce the state space down to an manageable size by abstracting away states that are not germane to the
operation we are interested in, namely (a) the repair of faults (b) the rollback process and (c) the
synchronization between the prime and the online (backup) systems. The result is a partial specification,
but which has enough detail left to partially validate the properties of interest.
4.3 Reducing the state space
There are a number of ways in which the state space can be reduced to a size amenable to model checking.
Firstly, the functional requirements of the system may be partitioned into equivalence classes, by exploiting
natural symmetries or subclasses that may be present in the domain. Secondly, the validation task can be
partitioned by separately validating requirements that are known to be independent from one another.
Validation of each requirement in isolation should traverse less of the overall state space than all of the
requirements taken together. In either case, detail that is not germane to each validation task can be
temporarily removed from the model. We will illustrate each of these approaches below.
For the DRS system, we partitioned the functional behavior by separating out the classes of fault that can
occur. A key fault protection requirement states that:
Fault protection shall be designed assuming only one fault occurs at a time, and
that a subsequent fault will occur no earlier than the response completion time
for the first fault, and that multiple detections occurring within the response
time are symptoms of the original fault.
The requirements identify 5 classes of faults that can occur on the spacecraft. Accordingly, the Mark and
Rollback process can be partitioned into five equivalence classes. Each can be treated independently of the
others, significantly reducing the size of the overall state space to be checked by the validation process. We
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alsoexploitedthesymmetrybetweentheredundantprocessorsrunningtheonlineandtheprimestrings,by
recognizingthateitherstringcouldrunoneitherprocessor.
Thefivefaultclassesareasfollows:
1. SFPExecutionNon-UVTrip
2. OnlineFault
3. PeripheralInterferingFault
4. PrimeFault
5. SFPUnder-VoltageTrip
Inthefirstthreecases,thePrimeStringwillhandlethefault,whilebothstringsuspendexecutionofthe
criticalsequence.Incase4,thefaultis intheprimestring,andtheonlinestringwill takeover.Theonline
stringthenbecomesprime.Inthefinalcase,thefaultcouldbeanywhere,soeitherprocessormayendupas
prime.Inallcases,oncethefaultprotectionresponseiscomplete,thecriticalsequenceshouldberesumed
fromthelastagedmarkpoint,bywhicheverprocessorisnowprime.
Equivalencelass1containsthefundamentalmarkandrollbackscenariocommontotheotherclasses
duringnormaloperationandit haslessstructureinthatit executesthesmallestubsetofstatesinthe5
partitionsconsideredabove.Wethereforeusedthisasthefirstvalidationexercise.Wewillconcentrate
onlyonthisclassfortheremainderofthepaper.It willbeseenthatvalidationofthisclasshasimplications
fortheotherequirementsclassesaswell.Weproceedfirstbyremovingallstatesinthestatechartsthatdo
notcontributetothemarkandrollbackprocess.Theresultingstatesareshowninfigures1and2.
Theprimestringnowcontains7statesandtheonlinestring5states.If weassumeonceagainthatasa
minimumagaineachstatecanbeimplementedwith4substates,thenthesetwoelementscontribute
74×54= 1,500,625states.
TheoverallstatespacecanbefurthereducedbyignoringtheCM and CS flags. By abstracting these two
flags away we will be checking only the fundamental mark and rollback process that depends upon the SFP
flag and the relative position of the markpoint with respect to critical sequence execution time. If we want
to learn about any possible effects of the CS and the CM flags they will have to be inserted back into the
model at some point. If the state space becomes too large, a non-exhaustive search option would then have
to be used.
A further strategy for reducing the state space is to reduce the complexity of the input data. The model can
be validated on the simplest possible test runs, and then if no errors are uncovered, the size of the dataset
can be increased gradually. In this case, the length of the critical sequence can be considered input data. A
minimal critical sequence would contain the smallest number of markpoints possible. A critical sequence
containing 3 markpoints was chosen for the initial exercise, as it contained sufficient complexity to
determine all possible combinations of fault occurrence and rollback.
Finally, by removing the states that are not executed in fault class 1, the state space was reduced to an
estimated:
(4 prime) 4 x (3 x 2 rendezvous packet) 2 x (3 online) 4 = 746, 496 states
Now adding an extra flag for the presence of a fault doubles this to 1,492, 992 states. This is still a
manageable state space for the Spin tool.
4.4 Validation of Case 1
A SFP Execution Non-UV Trip is a spacecraft fault that is outside of the DRS system per se. These
correspond to the type covered by partition 1 in this case study. In this case the prime string is given the
task of repairing the fault. The prime string would set the SFP flag to 1 to indicate a fault operation is in
progress; stop the running critical sequence; and enter the SFP Active state to repair the fault (see Figure 1).
The STB would still be transmitted to the online string once per second. That is, since the fault is outside of
the prime string, its ability to function has accordingly not been impaired. Having received the STB, the
online string will cease running its copy of the critical sequence and transition to the Fault Idle state,
waiting there until it receives an STB message indicating that the fault has been cleared. Once the prime
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string has repaired the fault it sets its SFP flag to zero and enters the Fault Idle state in preparation for
resuming the critical sequence. At this point it rolls back to the last valid (aged) markpoint; and resumes
executing its copy of the critical sequence at this location. When the online string sees an STB message
indicating that the SFP flag is 0, it enters the SEQUENCE CRITICAL state resuming execution of its copy
of the critical sequence at the aged broadcast markpoint.
The first step in the validation is to develop Linear Temporal Formulae representing the requirements to be
validated. Each LTL formula is then incorporated into the resulting Spin model as a "never" clause. Details
of the validation method are described in Appendix A.
To check that the desired fault tolerance is achieved, three separate functional requirements need to be
validated in each string:
R1. If a fault occurs when the last markpoint was at the start of the program, the prime string shall roll
back to the start regardless of how much time has expired since the program started running.
R2. If a fault occurs when the time t following the last markpoint was less than 3 seconds and the last
markpoint was not at the start of the program, the prime string shall roll back to the next previous
markpoint. That is, do not use the markpoint that has not yet been properly aged, even though it
has been encountered in the execution of the current critical sequence.
R3. If a fault occurs when the time t following the last markpoint was greater than or equal to 3
seconds the prime string shall roll back to the last valid aged markpoint.
Requirements R4, R5, and R6 are the same three requirements for the online string. These can all be
expressed as liveness conditions; they specify an action that must take place now or in the future.
Symbolically, the LTL formulae representing these conditions have the form:
OpA E3(p _ 0 q)
Where p is the occurrence of a fault, and q is the correct response. The formula expresses the condition that
eventually a fault (p) does occur, that once it occurs, at some point in the future the correct rollback
operation (q) will occur. The LTL equivalent of requirement R1 is as follows:
0 p A E3(p ---) 0 q) (R1)
where p = (SFP = 1)A(markpoint = start)
and q = (pc = markpoint)A(SFP = 0)
Where markpoint is the default markpoint address of the beginning of the sequence; pc is the critical
sequence machine program counter; and start is the address of the beginning of the critical sequence
program. Requirement R2 becomes:
0 r A [] (r ---)O s) (R2)
where r = (t < 3)A(SFP = 1)A(mp_current ;_ start)
and s = (pc = mp_next_previous)A(SFP = 0)
and R3 becomes:
0 u A I2(U ---) 0 v) with u and v defined as (R3)
where u = (t > 3)A(SFP = I)A (mp_current = mp_ge_three_sec)
and v = (pc = mp_current)A(SFP = 0)
Where t is time in seconds since the last encountered markpoint; here mp_current represents the current
markpoint and mp_previous represents the markpoint preceding mp current; each of these represents the
case where less than three seconds have expired, mpt_ge_three_sec represents the markpoint for the case
where three or more seconds have expired since the last encounter of a markpoint in the sequence.
Three analogous requirements are needed for the online string, using its copies of SFP and Mark:
0 h ^ [] Oa --_ 0 i) (R4)
0j A D(j---)0 k) (R5)
0 1A [](1 _ 0 m) (R6)
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Each additional LTL formula that is added to the model adds more complexity, making runtimes and
memory consumption very large. The best way to circumvent this problem is to validate each functional
requirement separately. For example, we can check that requirement R1 is satisfied without looking at R2
and R3 because they are independent requirements. However, requirement R1 is not independent of R4.
This non-orthogonality requires that both be validated in the same run. Semantically, this means that when
rollback takes place in the prime string under the condition that we are at the start of the program, then the
same rollback must be also shown to take place in the online string. The derivation in Appendix A shows
that a jointly operational BfJchi Automaton can be produced from separate LTL formula by writing down
the logical conjunction of the formulae and then converting the result to an equivalent automaton. The
conversion itself is done with the Spin option -f and is automatic although the user may want to apply a
certain amount of optimization on the result to make the resulting automaton more efficient. To keep the
resulting system at a minimum, the automaton for rollback to the beginning of the program is derived from
R1 and R4:
0 p A U(p --_ 0 q) A DO i (R7)
Analogous minimal LTL formulae were derived for the other 3 cases and they were implemented in the
model.
Additional validation can be performed by defining further properties that should hold in the model. For
example, we could check that aged markpoints are always in agreement with each other. This condition can
be stated by using the safety condition that the aged markpoint x in the prime string never disagree with the
aged broadcast markpoint y in the online string. The corresponding safety condition would be
[](x = y) (RS)
Additionally, assertions were used throughout the model to confirm that the model had the desired
behavior.
5 Results
Five different fault categories were identified to test the model. The results reported here cover the first of
these categories only (partition 1), but we do discuss implications for the other five fault categories. Fault
category 1 refers to the behavior of the DRS prime string in the face of a SFP Execution Non-UV Trip.
Six separate requirements on the rollback scheme were validated, as described in section 4.4. Each of the 6
requirements involved exhaustive examination of approximately 100,000 states in the model, and took
about 30 seconds each. The response and recovery in each case was to the injection of a non-UV trip fault
in all possible ways, based on the model. Three of the 6 runs for the 6 requirements failed in the
verification.
Three anomalies were identified and are described below. The first two are errors in the requirements that
might not occur in the DRS implementation. The third is a discrepancy in the detailed requirements that
could allow for erroneous behavior of the implemented system.
1. Depending on how error detection and repair is handled, it may be possible for the prime system to
detect and to repair an intermittent error within one second, and then consequently not to broadcast this
state to the online system. The online system would not receive notice of the fault; therefore, it would
continue executing its copy of the critical sequence. Repeated occurrence of this scenario would cause
the online string to get way ahead of the prime string, possibly to the point where the online string
would complete execution of its copy of the sequence. If the prime string subsequently fails, the online
string may not have a markpoint to roll back to. This anomaly is due entirely to the ordering of
processing described in the requirements specification.
2. This anomaly depends upon how faults are handled at the end of a critical sequence. If a fault occurs in
the prime string within two seconds after the end of the critical sequence is reached, it is not clear how
the rollback if any would be handled. The requirements specification did not designate the critical
sequence end instruction as a markpoint. Our validation run failed because our model assumed that
once the critical sequence completed, the online system returned to the Power Up Idle state;
accordingly there would be no suspended critical sequence to return to once the fault was corrected. If
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.the fault were to bring the prime system down, the online system may need to roll back to the last aged
markpoint. This anomaly is due to a missing requirement.
This anomaly concerns the occurrence of a fault 2 seconds after a markpoint is encountered in the
prime string. The prime system freezes the aging function at n + 2 seconds. Since faults that occurred
in the previous second are not broadcast to the online system until the current second, the online
system will continue to execute, aging its markpoint by one further second. At this point the online
system receives the SFP = 1 value and now both agers are frozen. Once the fault is repaired, the both
strings will roll back, but the online system will roll back to the newer markpoint. This would not
cause a problem if the prime system then completes the critical sequence. However, if the online
system should subsequently have to take over due to a prime failure - possibly associated with the
(symptomatic) fault that was just processed, it could roll to an inappropriate block of code. This
problem would not go away if the aging buffers were made deeper or shallower. It would just occur at
a different place since it is a consequence of the relative time difference between the two aging
schemes.
6 Discussion
The analysis technique used in this study is relatively new, and was not sufficiently mature just a few years
ago to enable its use. The DRS operates as a communication system that must be robust under the incidence
of arbitrary faults. The validation of requirements for such fault tolerant systems is particularly hard,
because of the non-determinacy introduced by the fault behavior. Holzmann [ 10] points out that even for
relatively simple communication protocols:
"It is almost impossible to manually verify correctness requirements such as the
ones discussed, no matter how diligent or disciplined the designer. The behavior
of even simple protocol systems can be of a complexity that no designer can be
expected to assess accurately. "
Worse still, the desired validation cannot be established through rigorous testing of the implementation
either. The complexity of the communication system, together with the non-deterministic occurrence of
faults makes exhaustive testing infeasible.
The use of model checkers opens up new possibilities for validating such systems. In principle, exhaustive
checking of the requirements model is also infeasible. However, by exploiting the structure of the state
space, a partial model can be extracted that is sufficient for the validation exercise. The reduction in the
size of the state space was critical in this case study, and was achieved by dividing the requirements into 5
partitions and abstracting away extraneous detail. The original (reduced) estimate of the size of the model
state space was over 100 million states. Although the estimate after simplification was between about
62,000 and 800,000 states, the actual number of states in the model was just over 100,000 states allowing
the validation of each of the six requirements in partition 1 to be completed in 30 seconds.
The complexity of the validation exercise was also reduced by validating requirements individually. It is
possible to combine requirements (and domain properties), as described in Appendix A, so that they can be
checked in a single validation run. However, doing so often increases the complexity of the model beyond
the limit of current model checking technology. Hence, we only combine requirements in this way when
they are known or suspected not to be independent.
It is important to note that with this approach, any claims of completeness are sacrificed; we are only
performing partial validation of partial specifications. Hence, the focus is not on proving correctness, but
on revealing errors [12]. We have shown in the case study that the approach is capable of finding subtle
errors that are otherwise almost impossible to detect. If we did not find any errors, that would not establish
correctness, but it does provide a higher level of assurance than is otherwise possible.
7 Summaryand Conclusions
We have demonstrated through a case study how fault tolerance requirements can be validated through
non-deterministic model checking. The system described in the case study used a mark and rollback
scheme to implement fault tolerance. The system has to complete high priority tasks called critical
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sequencesfficientlyandatthesametimetorespondtoandrepairfaults.Tomeetthisrequirement,hard
rollbackpoints(markpoints)areembeddedinthecriticalsequenceodesothatcompletedsubtaskswould
nothavetoberepeatedwhenfaultconditionsforcetheexecutingcriticalsequencetosuspendoperationto
servicethefault.Faultsoccurringwithinsubtasksarerepairedandrollbackis thendonetothestartofthe
lastuncompletedsubtask.A hotbackup(the'onlinestring')isoperationalsynchronouslytoincrease
reliabilityandavailability.
ThevalidationschemedescribedinthispaperwasimplementedasaSpinmodelwiththree3key
components.First,themodelcontainsanunderlyingoperatingsystem(executive)thatcontainsa
checkpointingschemer ferredtoasthemarkandrollbackprocess,whichwasmodeleddeterministically.
Second,ageneralizedcriticalsequencewaschosentobeexecutedbythemodeloperatingsystemtomake
it possibleforrequirementsanddesignerrorstosurface.Finally,afaultinjectionprocesswasusedtonon-
deterministicallyinjectasinglefaultintothesystem odel.Thevalidationsystemthenattemptedto
executethecriticalsequenceandtorecoverf omallpossibleinjectionsofasinglefaultintotheexecuting
criticalsequence.Inthisway3anomalieswerediscovered.
Themodelwasreducedtoafeasiblesizeforvalidationbyabstractingawayunnecessarydetaileaving
behindapartialspecification.Thefunctionalrollbackrequirementwaselaboratedinto6separatebut
dependentrequirements.A LinearTemporalLogicschemewasdevelopedtovalidate3pairsofcoupled
requirementsovertheduallyredundantsystem.Thisprocedureallowedtherollbackrequirementi he
primeorcontrolsystemtobevalidatedtogetherwithitscoupledancillarymirrorollbackrequirementi
theonline(hotbackup)system.Inthisway,thestudyshowedthatapartialspecificationforacomplex
spacecraftcontrollercanbeeffectivelyvalidatedwithintheframeworkoftheremainingrequirements.
Weplantoextendtheapplicationofthemethodologydemonstratedheretodevelopmentaleffortsoverthe
softwarelifecycleusingpartialspecificationsandtheirassociatedco-evolvingprototypeimplementations.
Theapproachworksbyinstrumentingapartialorcompleteimplementationnordertodetectthepresence
ofpathsthroughthestatespacethatcorrespondtothesatisfactionffunctionalrequirements.Theresulting
logfilesarethentransformedintoasetoftracestobeexecutedbyamodelcheckertovalidatethatkey
propertiesaremet.ThefunctionalrequirementsinthesystemarevalidatedbyexpressingthemasLinear
TemporalLogicpropositionsthataretranslatedintoanappropriateautomataypesupportedbythe
particularmodelcheckerinuse.Then,bytraversingtheannotatedlogfilesencapsulatedasprocessesover
themodel,thefunctionalrequirementsarevalidatedintheusualwaybythemodelcheckerasdiscussedby
Holzmann[5].
Thismethodologyhasbeensuccessfullyusedonapilotprojecttovalidateacomplexcommunications
protocolcalledRMP[13].TwoteamsconsistingofanIV&Vteamandasoftwaredevelopmentteamwere
used.BoththedevelopmentteamandtheIV&Vteamsworkedfromanevolvingpartialspecification.
Whilethedevelopmentteamwasresponsiblefortheimplementation,it wastheresponsibilityoftheIV&V
teamtoapplyamodelingschemetocheckthatheevolvingspecificationa dtheimplementationwere
consistentwitheachother.TheIV&Vteamthenusedthemodelcheckertovalidatetherequirements.In
thiswaywhenerrorsintheimplementationsurfacedtheycouldbebroughtuptodatewiththe
specification;andif thespecificationwereinerrortheimplementationcouldbeusedtoupdatethe
specification.Eachderivedoraddedrequirementwouldofcoursethenbeincrementallyvalidatedandused
toassistindrivingthespecificationforwardandsoon.Byworkingintandeminthisway,costly
backtrackingerrorsareprevented.Theresultwasasavinginoperationalefficiencyandlowermaintenance
costsduetogoodunderlyingdesign.
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9 Appendix A: Linear Temporal Logic Background
The Spin/PROMELA modeling scheme derives much of its power from its ability to incorporate formal
theorem proving elements into its search schemes. Btichi [ 14] discovered the fundamental relationship
between finite automata and the second-order monadic calculi. This innovation made it possible to
incorporate Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) assertions as components of computer modeling schemes.
A Btichi automaton is a nondeterministic Finite State Machine (FSM) A = (Z, S, "3_, S0, a_). I; is the input
alphabet, S is the set of states, S Othe set of initial states, and Fis the set of accepting states. _ e S x Z x
S is the transition relation. If ( s, cr, s') _ _ then A can move from s to s' upon reading _. A trace or input
word is an infinite sequence (s= (s I (r2 G3 ..... (ri _ I_, while a run r, over G is an infinite sequence so
s1 _ .... where so e SO,( s i, csi+l, Si+l) e 'J'_, i = 0, 1..... A run r is said to be accepting iff there exists
a state g E Fsuch that g appears infinitely often in r. The language £(A) is the set of all traces a such that
A has an accepting run over o.
Letfi be an LTL assertion corresponding to a system requirement to be validated that generates automaton
Ai. Given n Btichi automata of the form A i = ('Zi, S i, "/_i, Sol, _i), they are closed under the operation of
intersection. Their intersection I'l _.,A, accordingly is a Bachi automaton, and it accepts the language
rl _.,z cA,). The LTL formula that generates this automaton has the form
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Equation (1) allows multiple LTL formulae to be concatenated such that the resulting automaton will
preserve the characteristics of the language accepted by each automaton were it to be implemented in
isolation. This means that the set of all traces o, that were recognized by each automaton Ai in isolation
will also be recognized by the composite automaton N _.L cA,_.
By incorporating the Finite State Machine (FSM) representation of the formal properties to be validated by
the model, the model can be routinely checked for the presence or the absence of the desired characteristics.
The Spin/PROMELA system has an LTL translator that can produce the corresponding Biichi automaton
from an input requirement expressed as an LTL formula. The Spin modeling system checks to see that
finite state program P satisfies the temporal logic formulaf First, the global state graph of T is computed.
Second, the Btichi automaton is constructed for --,)5A__f. Third, the synchronous product P x A..,f is
computed. Finally, the validation run is performed on Px A._,f.For each state transition in P, Spin checks
to see if a corresponding transition in A..,f is possible. Once one of A_,js accepting states has been entered,
it must be shown that that state is reachable from itself. When this happens, A_.,$willhave been shown to
have recognized a string o from the language generated from the original LTL formula _f For efficiency,
Spin executes the 3 steps in 1 pass. At this point a trail file can be written showing the sequence of state
transitions in P that gave rise to the accepting state in A_.,f.This file can then be annotated and run as a test
case against the implementation.
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